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Valenti v. Nev. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 87 (Nov. 5, 2015)1 
EVIDENCE: EXPERTS 
Summary 
 The Court determined that a “chemist” as defined by NRS § 50.3202 must be qualified as 
an expert in a Nevada court of record prior to the admission of his or her affidavit attesting to an 
individual’s blood-alcohol concentration in a driver’s license revocation hearing.  
Background 
 On July 1, 2012, Vincent Valenti was pulled over for making two lane changes without 
signaling. The Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper observed signs of intoxication, and initiated 
several field sobriety tests. The test performances revealed signs of impairment, so the Trooper 
initiated a preliminary breath test. Valenti’s breath test indicated a blood-alcohol concentration 
of 0.154. Valenti was then arrested and transported to the Clark County Detention Center. Upon 
arrival, Valenti submitted to a blood test. Forensic scientist Christine Maloney conducted the 
blood-analysis, which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.159. 
 The Department of Motor Vehicles then notified Valenti in writing that his driver’s 
license was being revoked. Valenti requested an administrative hearing to contest the revocation. 
At the hearing, the administrative law judge admitted Maloney’s affidavit into evidence over 
Valenti’s objection. The affidavit stated that she was a chemist as defined under NRS 
§ 50.320(5),3 and that Valenti’s blood-alcohol concentration was 0.159 at the time of testing. 
Maloney’s affidavit did not state whether she had been previously qualified as an expert in a 
Nevada court of record.  
 The administrative law judge concluded Valenti’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 
or more at the time of the traffic stop. The judge explained that pursuant to Cramer v. State,4 
there are two classes of persons under NRS § 50.320,5 “chemists” and “any other persons,” and a 
chemist is not required to qualify as an expert before his or her affidavit is admitted into 
evidence.  
 Valenti then petitioned the district court for judicial review. The district court denied 
Valenti’s petition, concluding that Maloney’s affidavit indicated she was a chemist, and was 
therefore admissible.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1  By Shannon Diaz. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.320 (2009). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.320(5) (2009).  
4  126 Nev. 388, 240 P.3d 8 (2010). 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.320 (2009). 
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Discussion 
The language of NRS 50.320(1) is ambiguous 
 The Court concluded that a plain reading of NRS § 50.320(1)6 can “reasonably be read to 
offer different meanings.” On possible reading is that the “affidavits of both chemists and other 
persons are admissible as evidence in an administrative proceeding only if the affiant has been 
qualified previously as an expert in alcohol concentration in a Nevada court of record.” In this 
reading both “chemists” as well as “any other person” must be qualified in a Nevada court of 
record. Another possible reading is that “‘any other person’ is subject to the expert qualification 
requirement, but a ‘chemist’ is not.” “Because NRS § 50.320(1)7 may be read to render meanings 
at odds with one another, its language is ambiguous.” 
The Legislature has expressed no intent to release chemists from the established expert 
qualification requirement 
 When a statute is ambiguous, the Court looks to legislative intent.8 The Court determined 
that in 1995, a “chemist” was “additionally named as an individual whose expert affidavit must 
be admitted.” At that time the “Legislature espoused no intent to treat chemists differently, nor 
was any intent to treat chemists differently espoused when the 2009 Legislature added a 
definition to the term chemist.” Therefore, because the 2009 Legislature did not intend to 
“revoke the established requirement that chemists be court-qualified” the Court concluded that 
“such an attenuated conclusion is without justification.”9 
The reasoning and public policy set forth in Cramer v. State further direct that the court 
qualification requirement should be maintained for all experts, including chemists 
 In Cramer,10 the Court maintained the expert qualification requirement for experts, but 
declined to extend the holding to chemists. The Court reasoned that “[a]llowing an affidavit from 
a proposed expert, which lacks the reliability and trustworthiness of an affidavit from one who 
has been qualified to testify as an expert, would violate NRS § 50.320’s plain meaning and lead 
to absurd results.”11 “[T]he same concerns for reliability and trustworthiness of an expert 
affidavit arise when a person who is statutorily defined as a chemist is the affiant.” The Court, 
therefore, expanded the holding in Cramer to “include chemists under the umbrella of experts 
subject to NRS § 50.320(1)’s expert qualification requirement.” 
Conclusion  
 Maloney’s affidavit which indicated that she was a chemist but failed to state whether she 
had been qualified in a Nevada court of record, was inadmissible at Valenti’s revocation hearing. 
The Court then reversed the decision, and remanded the case to the district court.  
                                                          
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.320(1) (2009). 
7  Id. 
8  See Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 74, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). 
9  See Presson v. Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 208, 147 P. 1081, 1082 (1915). 
10  126 Nev. 388, 240 P.3d 8 (2010). 
11  Id. at 394. 
